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Abstract. The article emphasizes the various characters of legal phenomena, which are discoverable just from 
different aspects. The article approaches the problem of multidisciplinarity on the basis of some considerations of 
a concrete research. After that, it introduces the necessity of multidisciplinary tendencies as indirect consequences 
of Western analytical thinking. It outlines that evolution of legal philosophy results in a special plurality within 
jurisprudence. The article attempts to sketch the structure of multidisciplinary legal inquiry. 
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I. On some personal considerations
As Dworkin warned, if we wish to take rights seriously, we have to take into consideration 
not only norms, rules as texts, but we should consider legal principles and numerous morally 
relevant momenta. Moreover I would suggest that we should deal with the totality of human 
phenomenon, while we attempt to discover the world of law. As I see, there is no sharp 
demarcation between legal principles and moral-social principles. It is also a big question 
how moral-social principles can become legal principles, if we suppose the existence of 
such a sharp border. Of course, if we think this process happens by juridical authority, we 
hint to a formal moment again. 
We should take into account that despite that, moral principles can often be grasped 
conceptually, they do not take their origin from the territory of conceptuality, but they are 
rooted deeply in the nature of man, which has been formed fundamentally by an evolutionary 
process. Some moral principles have just cultural origin, so their nature is discoverable 
from wholly cultural aspects. Dworkin asserted “A general theory of law must be normative 
as well as conceptual”.1 It may be true. However, I suppose that although all research takes 
place by concepts, however, not only by them. On the other hand, usage of concepts does 
not mean that objects of inquires are exclusively concepts. Numerous legally relevant 
circumstances have non-conceptual, often unconscious, nature. Thus, we should be highly 
careful with conceptual approaches, and we must strive for a varied viewpoint, if we take 
legal philosophy seriously.
Some years ago I attempted to outline the spiritual origin of the Roman law, which 
undoubtedly constitutes the basis of Western law, especially of the continental legal 
systems.2 At the beginning it was clear for me that in the Roman law the strictly controlled 
forms not only restrict prevalence of equity and justice, but those result in the autonomy of 
law, result in law, as a separate phenomenon. The anxious-ritualistic attitude of the ancient 
* PhD legal adviser, Budapest.
E-mail: szmodisj@t-online.hu
1 Dworkin, R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, 1977. VII.
2 Szmodis, J.: A jog realitása. Az etruszk vallástól a posztmodern jogelméletekig (The Reality of 
the Law. From the Etruscan Religion to the Postmodern Theories of Law). Budapest, 2005.
248 Jenő SzmodiS
Roman law was conspicuous as opposed to the collective ideas about the “Proper” of Indo-
European tribes.
 While I examined the ontological nature of the Western law, I had to accept there are 
numerous previous non-legal questions, which can influence indirectly or directly the result 
of the legal research. Numerous particular problems emerge during the examination of the 
law, of which the answers fall under areas of other disciplines. Namely, law is often 
connected with religion, but wherein significant psychological phenomena appear. Thus, 
while we examine law, we have to answer in an appropriate way among others such 
problems, which are fundamentally in spheres of the history of religion or psychology.
And at this point we can meet a huge dilemma. We either ignore and neglect the non-
legal problems because of our incompetence or we attempt to use properly the knowledge 
of other disciplines during our inquiry. However, if we do not take relevant non-legal 
aspects into account, we renounce in advance a duly sophisticated legal concept, but if we 
carefully and circumspectly utilize the knowledge of non-legal disciplines, we can 
theoretically reach a really scientific concept of law, and we can describe its mechanism. in 
my opinion the latter option is more fruitful.
It was clear, previous researches ignored connection between the Etruscan religion and 
the Roman law despite religious determination of Roman law had been well known from 
Demelius3 to Max Weber,4 Wolff5 and MacCormack.6 On the other hand, that has been clear 
for a long time, that etruscan religion had exerted influence on Roman religion. in order to 
see the chain of “Etruscan religion–Roman religion–Roman law” and to compare structural 
similarities of Roman law and Etruscan religion, we should surpass the exclusively legal 
aspects and we should examine the question in historical, psychological and religious 
contexts.
Thus, we have to use a multidisciplinary approach, which does not take notice of the 
limitations of previous considerations, but always focuses on the emerging particular 
problems. During this process the topical question determines, selects and chooses the 
viewpoint of a certain discipline. That question, which is best connected with the concrete 
discipline. Consequently, multidisciplinary legal research, at least for me, is not only a 
theoretically acceptable possibility, but it is a practically tested and imperative method.
II. On the problem of multidisciplinarity
The well-known categorical attitude and analytical character of Western thinking have 
developed necessarily certain specialized disciplines. However, the scientific ideas, as 
models, have never been identical with the reality, which, although suffers from the 
simplification, but can take revenge. namely, in the most cases the one-sided logic can take 
us along just to a special point of the cognition. However, the phenomenon starts being 
silent from there. Thus, in my interpretation the “Multidisciplinary Legal Research” is an 
approach without a too restrictive methodology to support sophisticated analysis, often by 
syntheses.
3 Demelius, G.: Untersuchungen aus dem römischem Civilrechte. Weimar, 1856.
4 Weber: Economy and Society: an outline of interpretive sociology. University of California 
Press. Berkeley, 1978, 781–799.
5 Wolff, H. J.: Roman Law. An Historical Introduction. Norman, 1951, 49.
6 MacCormack, G.: Formalism, Symbolism and Magic in Early Roman Law. Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis, 37 (1969), 339–468, especially 439, 444, 445.
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Ortega wrote properly, only the scientist specializes, but science itself does not.7 Inter- 
and multidisciplinary approach have got foreground recognizing this circumstance. And 
I distinguish interdisciplinarity from multidisciplinarity at this point. Namely, in my 
interpretation the phenomena are interdisciplinary, and the cognition of them is 
multidisciplinary from different aspects. The things as momenta of reality are accessible 
from a lot of possible different aspects. It is true even if we do not take this circumstance 
into account in every case. Thus, although we tend to accept the legal institutions as being 
separated from other phenomena and other no-legal approaches according to our positivistic 
tradition, law and legal phenomena are interdisciplinary.
The conceptual analysis of law provides a lot of chances to discover the internal logic 
of a certain law. However, as we know, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience.8 It is also clear that the essence of law is in its function and this function can be 
realized just by the operation of law. The conceptual approaches are not able to catch this 
operation by analysis of the concepts. However, the functional approaches of law can take 
us along to a concept of law theoretically. Of course, the analytical-conceptual way can be 
highly helpful in cognition, but it is true first of all at such developed legal systems, which 
build themselves by concepts. We should not forget that our modern legal systems have not 
been built by only concepts and theoretical categories. Namely, these systems are 
continuation of a special ideological structure, which consisted of Christian morality, an 
irrational (but often expedient and efficient) system of the feudal domination and the Roman 
law. These are the deeper bases of our legal systems. Consequently, we can not renounce 
the analysis and inquiry of the past phenomena during cognition of the nature of our law. 
The historical aspect has a special importance from this point of view.
That is also clear, that legal philosophy is an interdisciplinary area, because this domain 
is situated between territory of the law and field of the philosophy. in spite of this fact, the 
acceptance of inter- and multidisciplinarity proved to be significantly harder in jurisprudence 
(as in humanities in general) than in natural sciences. Although this phenomenon can have 
various causes, however, I tend to think that the most probable reason for this is in nature of 
humanities. Namely, natural science is organized on the basis of expediency, whereas 
ideological momenta have a bigger role in the human disciplines and cultural evolution.9 
These contain such belief-like elements (imagination and ideas) which resist more strongly 
new thoughts and approaches than pragmatic-rational reflections.
From these aspects the traditional, analytical-conceptual attempts are especially 
interesting in approaches to the phenomena of normativity and validity. Also, that is thought-
provoking, how the categories of phenomenon and the concepts can get confused in this 
inquiry in certain measure. Moreover, certain paradox gets into these researches. We can 
expound only such elements from a concept, which have been taken into that previously. 
Namely, a concept cannot exist without its creator, although the phenomenon, which is 
covered by philosopher, can. We instinctively interrogate the modern concepts of normativity 
and validity on the basis of our democratic and rational ideology, however simultaneously 
we tend to smuggle certain contents into the examined concept, contents which are not in 
the concept necessarily. Thus, we should distinguish phenomena of normativity and validity 
from concepts of normativity and validity. I suppose, that the phenomenon of normativity 
7 Ortega y Gasset, J.: The Revolt of the Masses. Notre Dame (IN), 1985. Ind. 101–109.
8 Holmes, O. W.: The Common Law. Boston, 1881, 1. 
9 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I.: Human Ethology. New York, 1989, 12.
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(or validity) is rooted deeply in the complex of the human behavior (this is a special 
conglomerate of characteristics of human behavior),10 especially in obedience.11 
Fundamentally, irrational momenta get importance in this phenomenon, but rational 
considerations significantly do not. numerous efforts try to explain normativity in the 
context of conscious decisions, and these explanations do not take into account the irrational 
nature of real social processes.12 Thus, the concept of the normativity (or validity) is not 
discoverable by only a conceptual analysis, but its approach is possible by observation and 
in a descriptive way. Perhaps, the duality of phenomenon and concept is the biggest trap for 
the legal philosophers. Western thinking makes us believe, the conceptual way provides the 
best solution for cognition.
However, carefully contemplating over these things, we have to accept the circumstance 
that we should not use previous ideological suppositions (for example natural legal thoughts 
about will of majority or legal positivistic ideas about faultless creation of the norms and 
validity), if we wish to discover normativity (or validity) as a value-neutral ontological 
category. We should previously observe the operation of such things, about which we 
subsequently create concept. Frankly speaking, if we examine the men-created law and its 
validity and normativity, it is expedient to know the real nature of humankind, and not only 
which we wish to see about mankind and its law. However, in this case we open wide the 
door of the legal philosophy and we have to look into the disciplines of the human nature. 
And we cannot be sure, that we see, it will be identical to our previous ideological 
expectations about humanity.
III. Evolution of legal philosophy
In the late periods of the cultures an account necessarily comes to the front and a historical 
attitude, too. This happened also in the Western culture in the 18th century. We can see this 
not only on the basis of Spengler’s philosophy of history. Anyone can tell examples from 
his or her own life and on the basis of personal experiences, how the progress of the age is 
connected with the shaping of a historical attitude and a nostalgic view-point. At the same 
time, namely in the 18th century, history became a discipline, and gradually the historical 
attitude determined other forms of the thinking whether in the questions of the arts or in the 
problems of the law. Also, legal history became an independent branch of humanities, 
showing the changeability of the legal institutions and law itself. Legal philosophy, which 
significantly dealt with the connection of law and morality and researched the proper law 
previously, got dubious from that time.
Although Grotius and Pufendorf reminded us of the culturally determined character of 
law, the plurality of legal forms and spirits of the legal systems became more and more 
clear by the opening of the historical (and of course geographical) perspective. The historical 
view and the interpretation of social processes on the basis of their reasons and causes 
brought a sociological view to the foreground, while sociology also shaped an independent 
discipline. Legal sociology developed a separated direction of the research on the trails of 
10 Csányi, V.: Reconstruction of the Major Factors in the Evolution of Human Behaviour. 
Praehistoria, 4–5 (2003–2004), 221–232; see also Csányi, V.: Az emberi viselkedés (Human behavior). 
Budapest, 2006.
11 Milgram, S.: Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York, 1974.
12 Eibl-Eibesfeldt: op. cit. 12.
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works of Ludwig Gumplowicz13 and Max Weber,14 further enlarging the perspective of legal 
philosophy. Also, the revolution of the psychology, researches of Pierre Janet, Sigmund 
Freud, Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung did not leave legal philosophy intact and 
untouched. The existence of the law appears as a special interference of conscious and 
unconscious, instinctive mechanisms in the works of Scandinavian and American legal 
realism. Theories relating to culture and anthropology have helped comparative legal 
research, and legal anthropology come into existence too, while the scientific analysis of the 
literature formed the stream of “law and literature”, and economy laid the foundation of the 
economical analysis of law. However, the traditional questions and problems of the legal 
philosophy revolved around legal positivism and natural law in spite of gradual 
multidisciplinary transformation of philosophy of law.
Austin, Somló, Kelsen and Merkl and of course Langdell could summarize the 
problems of the law (as an autonomous phenomenon) in a so attractive way, and Stammler, 
Radbruch, Verdross, Rawls, Messner argued for the theory of the natural law so originally 
that the tension of this two characteristic standpoints influenced with a special force the 
discussion of the legal philosophy. Some decades later in the Critical Legal Studies (a highly 
exciting continuation of the American Legal Realism) the psychological stream became 
stronger again, but its (CLS) ideological disposition and its activist character has limited to 
the chances of this tendency in paradigmatic renascence and regeneration of legal 
philosophy.
In the middle of the 20th century a new discipline came into being again, namely 
ethology. On the basis of researches of Konrad Lorenz and other scientists not only animal’s 
behavior has been examined, but the scientific interest has been spreading on areas of 
human nature and behavior of mankind, and on the cognition and evolutionary description 
of humankind as a race. In this process among others Eibl-Eibesfeldt and such social-
psychologists created lasting works, who especially lively exposed human behavior, which 
is in the most cases independent of the cultural circumstances.
The ideological, quite idealistic and fundamentally speculative natural law got a chance 
to renewal from the biological, evolutionary view-point. Margaret Gruter, attempted to 
approach the phenomena of law15 on the basis of biological determination of the human 
behavior, and such excellent legal scholars joined her efforts as Wolfgang Fikentscher.16 
Thus, a new inspiration of legal thought arose again in the German cultural area after 
Pufendorf, Kant, Hegel etc., but this tendency could reach break-through only in America. 
Gruter completed a pioneering work by her fundamental books, by the foundation of Gruter 
Institute, and by initiating international conferences. Owen D. Jones continues Gruter’s way 
13 Gumplowicz, L.: Der Rassenkampf. Sociologische Untersuchungen. Innsbruck, 1909.
14 Weber: op. cit.
15 Gruter, M.−Bohannan, P.: Law, Biology-Culture: The Evolution of Law. Santa Barbara, 1983; 
Gruter, M.: Law and the Mind: Biological Origins of Human Behavior. Newbury Park, 1991; Gruter, 
M.−Masters, R.: Common Sense, and Deception: Social Skills and the Evolution of Law. In: Großfeld, 
B.–Sack, R.–Möllers, T. M. J. (Hrsg.): Festschrift for Wolfgang Fikentscher. Tübingen, 1998. 
16 Fikentscher, W.–McGuire, M.: A Four-Function Theory of Biology for Law. Rechtstheorie, 
25 (1994), 1–20;  Fikentscher, W.: Modes of Thought: A Study in the Anthropology of Law and 
Religion. 2nd ed., Tübingen, 2004; Fikentscher, W.: Law and Anthropology: Outlines, Issues, 
Suggestions. München, 2009.
252 Jenő SzmodiS
not only by excellent writings,17 but he managed to systematize evolutionary jurisprudential 
efforts by the organization of the Society Evolutionary Analysis in Law.
However, all these ambitions and exertions exist just as alternatives of the mainstream 
of legal philosophy. It is also clear that the biological interpretation of law18 is spreading in 
the same way, as the research of law as an interdisciplinary phenomenon. The establishment 
of the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal was a quite early moment of the 
latter process in 1978. Nowadays inter- and multidisciplinary research and interpretation 
come to the foreground more and more at universities and institutions.
The common aspects of the law and the environment are accentuated at the Vanderbilt 
University Law School over and above evolution related researches of Jones. The Centre 
for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at the Ohio State University Moritz College 
wishes to illuminate the connections of law, nature, society and the culture. In the 1990s 
reorganized Interdisciplinary Academic Programs of the University of Chicago Law School 
shows properly the essence of multidisciplinary legal efforts, namely “the law does not 
exist in a vacuum”. However, the Planning an Interdisciplinary Curriculum of the Vermont 
Law School aims a many-sided approach of the law in the same way. The Yale Law School 
Forum on Multidisciplinary Legal Research has facilitated intellectual exchange among 
graduate students with research in legal or legal-related issues by more meetings. Especially 
remarkable are researches of David Garland at the New York University School of Law, 
which map the connections between punishment and culture.19 However, in Europe also 
there are some ambitions to break out from our traditional concepts and theories, eliminating 
boundaries between legal and non-legal phenomena. John Bell has warned properly “The 
study of all legal subjects needs to be informed by theory and perspectives non-legal 
disciplines”.20 Related to the change of thinking maurio zamboni’s article is very 
considerable, which marks acclimatization of evolutionary theory in the domain of legal 
theory.21
With some superficiality we can establish that in the theoretical researches of law the 
cultural approach, biological-evolutionary interpretations,22 and in general multidisciplinary 
tendencies gain more and more ground.23 The biological tendency is fundamentally related 
to that fact that in the past half century such an amount of scientific knowledge concerning 
mankind has been accumulated, that cannot be neglected by legal philosophy. The change 
17 Jones, O. D.: Law, Evolution and the Brain. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. 
Biological Sciences, 359 (2004), 1697–1707; Jones, O. D.: Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated 
Model of Human Behavior. Journal Contemporary Legal Issues, 8 (1997), 167–173.
18 Guttentag, M.: Is There a Law Instinct? Washington University Law Review, 87 ( 2009) 269, 
270–327.
19 Garland, D.: A Culturalist Theory of Punishment. Punishment and Society. The International 
Journal of Penology, 11 (2009) 2, 259–269.
20 Bell, J.: Legal theory in legal education–“Anything you can do, I can do meta…”. In: Eng, S. 
(ed.): Proceedings of the 21st IVR World Congress. Stuttgart, 2005, 61–68, 61.
21 zamboni, m.: From “evolutionary Theory and Law” to a “Legal evolutionary Theory”. 
German Law Journal, 9 (2008) 4, 515–546. 
22 Guttentag: op. cit. 2009.
23 Clark, R. C.: The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution. The Yale Law Journal, 90 
(1981) 5, 1238–1274; see a careful new opinion Parisi, F.: Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Legal 
Education. University of St. Thomas Law Journal, 6 (2009) 2, 347–357.
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of our image about human nature allows us less and less to base the examination of the law 
on old and ideological thought.
As an explanation for the multidisciplinary approach of law it appears in most cases 
that lawyers have to prepare themselves for certain special knowledge related to that 
profession, rules of which will be used by them. Although it is true, there are two more 
cardinal reasons for changing view. Firstly, a general inter- and multidisciplinary tendency 
of the science, secondly the legal positivistic idea about the autonomy of law, as among 
others the theory of Langdell drafted, is less and less tenable. These circumstances touch 
first of all practice, legislation and application of the law. However, we should know, the 
multidisciplinary legal research, and multidisciplinary analysis of law are important in the 
legal philosophy, too.
Moreover, legal philosophy has to clarify the structural inter-relations among the 
approaches of different scientific disciplines. in an optimal case various approaches to law 
do not coexist just incidentally, haphazardly, offering only alternative aspects. Thus, in my 
interpretation the multidisciplinary legal research in the long run is not only a conglomerate 
of the coequal viewpoints, but it is a special system from generality to peculiarity, wherein 
the examination is fundamentally adapted to the respective ontological, law-determining 
levels. Namely, really existing (thus not hypothetical and imaginary) legal systems have 
been built on certain biological determinants, onto the basis of the complex of human 
behavior. of course, this basis permits several, often conflicting, solutions, but from these 
cultural characteristics and traditions select and shape the actual institutions.
Within the culturally determined system of course there is room for conceptual 
approaches and analyses of the law, but first of all only where the legal system exhibits a 
definite conceptual construct. Thus, i presume that the three fundamental levels of the 
approaches to law can be distinguished (biological, cultural and conceptual), which could 
be also complemented by horizontal viewpoints. We will return to these later.
IV. Structure of multidisciplinary legal research
The multidisciplinary approach of law could have various reasons and aims. This approach 
could promote dialogue among disciplines, could prepare practicing lawyers for application 
of such rules, which concern special professions, could help legislation in shaping efficient 
norms. From the aspect of legal philosophy, namely from the aspects of existence and nature 
of law the multidisciplinary approach has a fundamental importance, too. First of all, the 
view about human nature can influence the legal concepts. The different legal philosophical 
standpoints always set out from certain ideas concerning the humanity, even if they do not 
explicate this circumstance. These notions are determined culturally, moreover there could 
be more anthropological ideas within a culture subsequently, but simultaneously, too. In the 
Western culture a quite holy and idealistic view existed, because of a long domination of 
the Christian morality. This notion was followed and pushed to the background by a secular-
rational vision about the human. Reformation and its rational attitude played and eminent 
role in this process. 
The irrational aspects as a consequence of the result of modern psychology came to 
the front in 19th century. Then a highly sophisticated human-view appeared by the emergence 
of ethology and human ethology. Humankind is characterized in this scientific interpretation 
simultaneously among others by belief-like ideas (common beliefs),24 inclination to 
24 Eibl-Eibesfeldt: op. cit.
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constructions, altruism, indoctrinability and tendency to imitation.25 Human ethology 
explains human character by evolutionary factors and processes, emphasizing characteristic 
elements can gain varying importance in various cultures. The environment and the above- 
mentioned inclination to imitation and indoctrinability can get a huge significance in shaping 
of concrete cultural forms.26 General human characteristics, as sociability, sensitiveness to 
mutuality, obedience, so-called rule-following behavior and distinction between own group 
and alien group are present in all human societies.
Consequently, during the examination of social rules and law we should set out from 
such scientific vision about people, which describes and defines mankind as a race. This 
means omission of ideological views and departure from fundamentally emotionally 
determined approaches and concepts, and this means necessarily the consideration of human 
ethological model and facts, especially the so-called complex of human behavior. Thus, 
there is a fundamental biological, human ethological and evolutionary psychological level 
of the examination of law, which discovers for us, what the human nature is in general. This 
human quality can create various institutions and processes, however, in the reality we 
always meet quite definite and concrete forms of phenomena. namely, every single culture 
shapes its solutions according to its own spirit and postulates whether in religion, in science 
and art, or relating to different social control.27 
So, in my interpretation, the second level of examination of law must be the cultural 
level, wherein cultural anthropological, legal sociological viewpoints can come to the front, 
and aspects of philosophy of religion and history of religion, or philosophy of history could 
get in focus. We should take into account this natural level in order to avoid numerous 
intellectual and ideological traps. For example the slavery is not accepted by natural law; 
however, Aristotle thought this institution coming from nature. Moreover, opposite to our 
modern human opinions, slavery has been and is present everywhere, but sometimes this 
phenomenon is marginal, illegal and it is named euphemistically. However, it emerges so 
stubbornly, that it cannot be opposite to nature. Consequently, we should examine very 
carefully the occurrence of slavery, and we should take very seriously this phenomenon in 
order to know, eliminate and remove that. As I suppose, this phenomenon is connected to 
the distinction between own group and alien group, because slavery can exist relatively 
lastingly in intercultural or intersexual relations. (See source of slavery from captivity; 
black slavery; in Rome selling of debtors as slaves “trans Tiberim”, so to an other group; or 
in general sexual slavery as usual from foreign counties.)28 However, within groups 
sociability, empathy and altruism are more significant. Thus, we should know humans 
openly and without illusions to develop humane societies and legal systems.
On the verge of this two levels of inquiry there are psychological approaches 
simultaneously explaining the culturally and biologically coded phenomena. In my opinion 
for example the “father-complex” theory of Jerome Frank29 as a paraphrase or variation of 
25 Csányi: Reconstruction of the Major Factors... op. cit.
26 Richerson, P. J.−Boyd, R.: The evolution of human ultra-sociality. in: eibl-eibesfeldt, 
i.−Salter, F. K. (eds): Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare. Evolutionary Perspectives. New York, 
1998, 71–95.
27 Kohler, J.: Das Recht als Kulturerscheinung. Würzburg, 1885.
28 Eibl-Eibesfeldt: op. cit. 402–421.
29 Frank, J.: Law and the Modern Mind. New Brunswick, 2009.
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ideas of Feud, the feminist legal theory (at Critical Legal Studies),30 and of course some of 
my ideas, too, on the basis of Jung, mean among others such psychological analysis of the 
law. From this aspect numerous statements of Scandinavian Legal Realism are highly 
relevant. This psychological-legal researches discover phenomena, which have got 
significant just in certain cultures, although which take their origins from nature.
I regard the conceptual analysis of law as a third level of examination. This approach 
could have excellent importance in legal cultures, wherein the concepts and categories have 
more special significance, than in “average legal culture”. Thus, we have to use secular-
rational concepts consistently, because Western law gradually became secularized and it 
detached itself from its religious roots and possibility of religious-moral interpretation. The 
reception of Roman law played a major role in conceptual effort. It seems, the analytical-
conceptual ambitions got decisive necessarily in the Western legal philosophy.
As I have mentioned, three levels (biological, cultural, conceptual) of legal examination 
model the levels of reality from generality to peculiarity. This is the so-called vertical 
system of cognition. Biological, evolutionary phenomena characterize all humankind, 
culturally coded phenomena are valid within a certain culture or cultural region. However, 
concepts could have different meanings according to the domain of use of those concepts. 
Thus, the various scientific approaches are not accidental and only alternative, but they are 
complementary shaping a special system, and they impregnate spheres of each-other.
However, certain approaches are not situated on the basis of axis of the generality and 
the peculiarity, but they are arranged on the basis of domain of special interests. So moral-
philosophical, theological, nature legal, historical, literatural (and other) approaches to law 
could comprehend more levels of generality and peculiarity. I regard these as a horizontal 
system of the legal examination. Independently of this circumstance, certain horizontal 
approaches could be more firmly connected with some vertical aspects. For example natural 
law necessarily could be connected with the human ethological analysis of law, the historical 
and literatural researches with cultural level. Of course, approaches of legal philosophy are 
categorizable in other way, because our categories are just models of the colorful world. 
However, we should in any case consider that our current, temporary, concrete approach is 
just one of huge pile of possible approaches. Nevertheless, we should take into consideration 
various aspects and approaches of law, if we take legal philosophy seriously. 
 
30 McKinnon, C.: Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 8 (1983) 2, 635–658.
